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I. Henri de Lubac and His Legacy
Among those who belong to the nouvelle theologie movement, Henri de Lubac, S.J., seems to have made the greatest effort to go back to the rich tradition of the Church in order to 
resolve conflicts way ahead of him.1 This has resulted in several works 
on various aspects of the Christian faith such as the catholicity of the 
Church, the sacramental element of the Eucharist, and the spiritual 
interpretation of the Scriptures, among others. De Lubac’s intellectual 
endeavours eventually left treasures which the Church (especially in 
and after the Second Vatican Council) has come to appreciate and 
adopt in her faith and life.
One of these treasures is de Lubac’s unique way of articulating 
divine revelation which is heavily rooted in the spiritual experience 
of the Church Fathers, an experience which led them to develop a 
mystical way of speaking about God, a kind of “negative theology” 
1David Grumett, “Henri de Lubac: Looking for Books to Read the World,” 
in Gabriel Flynn & Paul D. Murray, eds., Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal 
in Twentieth-century Catholic Theology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
237–238.
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that was significant even until the time of the medieval period. This 
way of speaking about God—which implied that knowledge and 
experience of him can only be intuited by faith—did not attempt to 
exhaust or define God’s mystery. In this light, one may ask: how should 
one understand de Lubac’s articulation of divine revelation, and in what way is it 
significant in his theology?
The present article attempts to answer this question by presenting a 
sketch of de Lubac’s own theology of revelation which distinctly bears 
elements of the “negative” theological tradition of the Church Fathers. 
This involves discussing several themes in de Lubac’s own thought, 
namely a) the intellectual atmosphere to which de Lubac responds 
with a “rediscovery” of divine revelation, b) his articulation of divine 
revelation in his work The Discovery of God, which has both positive and 
negative elements of divine revelation, and c) the significance of this 
articulation alongside other themes on Christian faith and life which 
de Lubac has worked on. Lastly, this article shows that, for de Lubac, 
Christianity revolves around coming to know the mystery of God and 
living in that mystery which lies at an infinite distance from the mind. 
Although the mind desires to define and understand the mystery of 
God, it is visible and open only through the eyes of faith and love. 
II. Understanding the Various Forms of Atheism 
Outside and Within Catholic Theology
Hans Urs von Balthasar regarded de Lubac’s theological enterprise 
as his endeavour to confront the humanism of his time. It was a 
period heavily characterized by the loss of a sense of transcendence 
and an affirmation of humanity that had no need for a divine figure 
above it.2 De Lubac’s interest in divine revelation was primarily 
anthropological—he desired to redefine human existence and 
2See Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri de Lubac: An Overview, trans. 
Joseph Fessio & Michael M. Waldstein (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 
46–54.
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humanity’s search for meaning and transcendence according to how 
the Christian faith sees and understands the human being.3
More than that, however, de Lubac was also concerned with the 
problem of neo-Scholastic theology during his time, which alienated 
the human being and his life of faith from Church teaching and 
theology. These two forms of atheism within and outside the Church 
and Catholic theology prompted de Lubac to reflect on divine 
revelation and rethink the way it was thought of and presented.
In The Drama of Atheist Humanism, “a collection of articles loosely 
gathered together but internally a powerfully constructive work,”4 de 
Lubac broadly analysed an array of prominent thinkers who spoke of 
God, faith, and religion. The first of its three parts discussed how the 
understanding of human life in the philosophies of Ludwig Feuerbach, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, and Karl Marx eventually led to a total separation 
of the human being from God. However, the idea of becoming human 
without the need for God was duly critiqued by Søren Kierkegaard, 
who delved into the depths of human experience to affirm in his own 
way the God who had been denied and considered dead.5 The second 
part was devoted to the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte, who 
yearned to replace the decadent Catholic Church in France with a 
vibrant positivism which stressed the evolution of the human mind 
towards a state in which a person could do away with God.6 The 
common ground among these thinkers was the rejection of God in 
order to give way to the rise of humanity, with a radical affirmation 
of freedom and self-determination.
3This is already evident in his discussion of atheist humanism, as he expresses 
to respond to an understanding of the human being which brings him towards 
himself but thrusts himself away from God (Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist 
Humanism, trans. Edith M. Riley [Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 
1950], vii–viii).
4von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri de Lubac, 48.
5de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 54.
6de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 77–78.
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According to de Lubac, Feuerbach’s rejection of God was founded 
on his own concept of God as a mere expression of human aspirations.7 
As such, it was necessary that God —who is but a myth which the 
human being projects of himself—be banished so that he could 
be replaced by the human being who, after all, is the true god who 
possesses “liberty, dignity, reason, and prosperity,” the very things that 
the god or gods of myth have deprived the human being of.8 Marx 
then took this thesis to the threshold when he said that what Feuerbach 
ultimately lacked in his rejection of God was a total critique of religion 
and the actual conditions of his time. This was what Marx had set out 
to do— he developed Feuerbach’s “cult of the abstract man” towards 
a religion of workers concerned with material conditions of living that 
rejected God as its basis.9 Through this, Marx believed that he had 
properly restored the human being’s divinity as he thought it should be.
Nietzsche, also a disciple of Feuerbach, moved toward another 
direction as he announced the death of God which the human being 
should wish for.10 This “murder” of the divine would allow the human 
being to emerge as himself, to transcend his present condition. In de 
Lubac’s view, Nietzsche calls the human being to 
produce out of himself—out of nothingness—something with which 
to transcend humanity; let him trample his own head under foot and 
shoot forth beyond his shadow …. The endurance test to which he was 
condemned himself will reveal to him his own divinity by bringing it 
into being. God is dead, long live the Superman!11
This “Superman,” creating his own fate and values and affirming his 
own human power, now walks alone and free to determine his end 
7de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 8.
8de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 13.
9de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 14–15.
10de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 22.
11de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 25.
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and destiny, for he has no other God to bow to, and look forward to, 
except himself.12
In de Lubac’s view, Nietzsche’s and Marx’s portrayal of the human 
being shows them to be atheistic humanists. While de Lubac finds in 
this way of thinking the value of affirming the human being’s power, 
he points out that, in the end, this kind of humanism fails to truly 
understand the human being and his search for meaning.13 Coming 
from the perspective of the Christian faith, de Lubac points out that 
this atheistic endeavour to liberate and develop the human being 
leads to self-destruction. This denial of God indeed allows the human 
being to emerge, but as one who is alone and by himself, unable to 
understand himself and pursue the meaning of existence. This is so 
because he has been fully extracted from the ultimate transcendence, 
from God who has shown himself to the human person as the ultimate 
purpose, meaning, and destiny that he seeks.14 Simply put, humanity 
in rejecting God is also rejected and replaced with idols that speak of 
empty freedom and grandeur.
The same conclusion can be drawn from Auguste Comte’s 
positivism, which he hails as the peak of the human being’s intellectual 
12de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 26–27.
13This is more evident in the second chapter of The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 
when de Lubac juxtaposes Nietzsche with the philosopher Kierkegaard. 
Nietzsche’s critique of Socrates and Socratism in order to pave the way for 
acknowledging and appreciating the element of mystery in the life of the 
human being in a sense also allowed Christian thought to break away from a 
narrow rationalism that left the Christian religion dry, and towards something 
that affirms and enriches life. Kierkegaard, however, sees the value of Socrates 
in terms of his method, and uses his method not to deny God like Nietzsche 
did but instead to affirm Him as part of the mystery that the human being 
questions and confronts in his existence. For de Lubac, Kierkegaard points out 
that the true end of Socratic questioning is in fact a recognition of the failure 
to completely understand this mystery, and thus calls for the human being’s 
faith that leads to a “deeper immersion in existence.” See de Lubac, The Drama 
of Atheist Humanism, 40–44, 52–55, 60.
14de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 32.
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evolution. From this standpoint, Comte sees religion as fetishistic 
and infantile. In him, de Lubac sees an atheism that, beyond denying 
God, goes toward “the ideal of humanity” which can be achieved 
only through the comprehensive understanding of “nature, history, 
and mind” as promised by positivism.15 Comte asserts, therefore, that 
positivism must replace Catholicism in all its aspects, as the human 
mind of his age is mature enough to take its place.
Such a replacement comes in the form of radical “transpositions” 
that supplant aspects of Catholicism with their counterparts in 
positivism. The foundation of this positivist religion is not the Triune 
God but the trinity of “Being, Fetish, and Environment,”16 and the 
faith of its believers is demonstrable, founded on arguments that are 
certain.17 The decadent Catholic priesthood is going to be replaced with 
scientists and positivist thinkers who bear a certain “encyclopaedic 
mind” which systematizes everything.18 Above all, what is worshipped 
is humanity itself, not the Catholic God whose power and omnipotence 
only lead to the egoism of the human being.19
In all these efforts, de Lubac sees Comte luring himself into his 
own trap, caught in the same illusion that the human being can come 
to know himself through his own powers.20 With no possibility for 
transcendence, the human being remains within himself. The result 
is a sociocracy that can easily degenerate into sociolatry, an undue 
veneration of society or state that resembles a “tyrannic regime.” In 
effect, the forces that the human being desires to control within himself 
15de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 79–81.
16de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 131.
17de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 141.
18de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 138–139.
19See de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 107–108.
20de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 147.
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and within his society will crush him and deprive him of meaning 
and purpose.21
De Lubac’s critique of this atheistic humanism leads to the question 
“who, then, is the God that the Christian faith believes in?” It is 
certainly not the God as understood and presented by the Catholic 
theology of his time, which has fundamentally failed to understand 
God’s revelation and his relationship with the human being. In a way, 
this could be regarded as the other kind of atheism which de Lubac 
had to confront, an atheism of a sort which was very much present 
within the intellectual tradition of the Church.
The Catholic theology that de Lubac inherited and worked with, 
especially during his years in formation at the Jesuit houses in France 
and England,22 was the Church’s own effort to defend Christianity 
from modernism, which stressed the primacy of reason in all aspects 
of human life, religion and faith included.23 In this regard, the Church 
returned to the authority of St. Thomas Aquinas, with Pope Leo XIII 
establishing neo-scholasticism as the Church’s official intellectual 
framework for defending its teachings against, and attacking the errors 
of, modernism.24 This move proved to be beneficial for the Church, 
21de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 157.
22John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning 
the Supernatural (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005), 
1–2. See also Aidan Nichols, “Henri de Lubac: Panorama and Proposal,” The 
New Blackfriars 93:1043 (2012): 10–12; Georges Chantraine, “The Supernatural 
Discernment of Catholic Thought According to Henri de Lubac,” in Serge-
Thomas Bonino, ed., Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth-century 
Thomistic Thought, trans. Robert Williams (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2009), 
22–23.
23For a brief background on modernism and its influence on Catholic theology 
during the 19th century, see Gerald A. McCool, Nineteenth-century Scholasticism: The 
Search for a Unitary Method (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989), 17–19.
24See Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris 21–23, available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/
leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris.html. 
It is important to note here that Leo XIII not only established the primacy of 
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as it paved the way for a more synthetic and systematic articulation 
of the Christian faith. Moreover, this also allowed for the emergence 
of a rich neo-scholastic tradition which de Lubac himself largely 
benefited from.
De Lubac, however, was not satisfied with the Thomism which 
he studied. It was not so much because of St. Thomas himself; rather, 
it was because of the way St. Thomas was interpreted and discussed 
by his commentators, most especially Thomas Cajetan and Francisco 
Suarez, whose Thomism de Lubac received from his Jesuit formation.25 
An important concern for de Lubac was the way neo-scholasticism 
understood the human being, God, and the relationship between the 
two. Thus, what he found disconcerting and seemingly erroneous in 
neo-scholasticism was its view on the relationship between grace and 
nature in the human being’s search for God.
What was problematic for de Lubac in Cajetan’s and Suarez’s 
reading of St. Thomas was the view that human existence had two 
possible ends: one natural, by virtue of his existence as a human being, 
and another supernatural, a separate order which was only possible for 
the human being through the grace of God. Furthermore, to preserve 
the gratuity of being ordained towards a natural end, Cajetan used the 
idea of “pure nature” (natura pura). According to him, the human being 
had a purely natural end outside the elevation of grace.26
St. Thomas’ thought in terms of its synthetic value. He also saw it fit because it 
has historical precedence and provides practical benefits, among which is the 
means for a defense against the heretics of its time. See also Grumett, “Henri 
de Lubac: Looking for Books to Read the World,” 237.
25De Lubac learned Suarezian Thomism under the tutelage of Fr. Pedro 
Descoqs, his Jesuit professor in philosophy (Chantraine, “The Supernatural 
Discernment of Catholic Thought According to Henri de Lubac,” 25).
26See Henri de Lubac, “The Mystery of the Supernatural,” in Theology in History, 
trans. Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 296–297. De 
Lubac shows that it was, in fact, Cajetan who was able to fully articulate this 
notion as, more than just being a hypothesis, something that is real and separated 
from “supernature” made possible by grace (see Henri de Lubac, The Mystery 
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In the broader perspective of the relationship between God and the 
human being, this meant reducing God as a distant end to be pursued. 
This kind of thinking created a greater rift between the realm of the 
human being and the life of God, as if the former could be separated 
from the latter. De Lubac observed that,
[w]hile wishing to protect the supernatural from any contamination, 
people had in fact exiled it altogether—both from intellectual and 
from social life—leaving the field free to be taken over by secularism. 
Today that secularism, following its course, is beginning to enter the 
minds even of Christians. They too seek to find a harmony with all 
things based upon an idea of nature which might be acceptable to a 
deist or an atheist: everything that comes from Christ, everything 
that should lead to him, is pursued so far into the background as to 
look like disappearing for good. The last word in Christian progress 
and the entry into adulthood would then appear to consist in a total 
secularization which would expel God not merely from the life of 
society, but from culture and even from personal relationships.27
Moreover, this sense of secularism comes with a perspective of 
God who is absent from the everyday concerns of the human being, 
from his mundane preoccupations with the ultimate questions that 
continually disturb him and call for his attention. This act of postulating 
a purely natural world eventually leads people to conceive “beyond 
that universe another, designated as ‘supernatural’ and declared ‘more 
excellent,’ ‘more perfect,’ or rather perfect in a different way, but 
of which there remains nothing else that can be said.”28 Examined 
of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed [London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1967], 
7–9; Susan Wood, “The Nature-Grace Problematic Within Henri de Lubac’s 
Christological Paradox,” Communio 19 [1992]: 391; Chantraine, “The Supernatural 
Discernment of Catholic Thought According to Henri de Lubac,” 28).
27de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, xi–xii, 61. See also Chantraine, “The 
Supernatural Discernment of Catholic Thought According to Henri de Lubac,” 
30–31, which outlines the various consequences of the concept of natura pura, 
among which includes one of de Lubac’s main concerns: the separation between 
philosophy and theology.
28de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 55–59.
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closely, it is nothing but a practical form of agnosticism in which God 
is reduced to a principle that cannot be achieved by the human being, 
a first and last term, taken in its narrow sense, in a link of causes. At 
best, it is a separation of human life from faith and theology, a life 
without anything to reflect on except its own ideas and concepts.29 
As a consequence, what remains is a human being that is “isolated, 
uprooted, and ‘disconcerted,’” and left with a world that is broken.30 
What happens here in a way is a loss of the sense of God even within 
the Christian faith, and the result is another form of atheism similar 
to that which the Church has tried to defend herself against.
Responding to these two forms of atheism that challenge the 
Christian faith, de Lubac embarked on a rediscovery of the nature of 
God and his relationship with the human being.
III. The Discovery of God: The Intertwining Paths of 
Negation and Affirmation
Using various sources available to him during his time, de Lubac 
searched for an answer to the question of divine revelation. First, he 
returned to the writings of the Church Fathers in which he found a 
uniquely Christian way of being, believing, and acting that stood largely 
unnoticed in his time. De Lubac thus firmly believed that grappling 
with the questions and answers of the Fathers of the Faith would bring 
out a more genuine understanding of Christianity for his own time. 
Through them, he was able to bring out “certain permanent features … 
among the very diverse and sometimes contrary trends of Tradition.”31 
29See Chantraine, “The Supernatural Discernment of Catholic Thought 
According to Henri de Lubac,” 31; Nichols, “Henri de Lubac: Panorama and 
Proposal,” 14.
30Henri de Lubac, “Christian Explanation of Our Times,” in Theology in History, 
trans. Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 443.
31Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man, trans. 
Lancelot Sheppard & Elizabeth Anne Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
85Henri de Lubac’s Theology of Revelation
Regarding divine revelation in particular, de Lubac frequently went 
back to St. Augustine who was able to explain the different aspects of 
Christianity and synthesize them into an organic whole.32
Beyond the rich Christian literature offered by the ancient Church, 
de Lubac also made use of his extensive formation in literature and 
philosophy, which provided him with an opportunity to encounter and 
confront figures (such as Fyodor Dostoevsky and Paul Claudel) whose 
insights on the human condition allowed him to speak and react against 
the prevailing intellectual atmosphere of his time.33 Moreover, he used 
the existential philosophy of his time which dealt with the mystery 
of human existence;34 among these philosophers, Maurice Blondel 
exercised a great influence on de Lubac with his own insight on human 
action as that which opens the human being toward transcendence.35
1988), 19–20; Grumett, “Henri de Lubac: Looking for Books to Read the 
World,” 247.
32For the influence of St. Augustine in de Lubac’s articulation of revelation, 
see Henri de Lubac, The Discovery of God, trans. Alexander Dru (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, Ltd., 1960), 11–17. Milbank sees this Augustinian influence 
on the pages of Surnaturel and Augustinisme et théologie moderne, where de Lubac 
used Augustine against those who have misread him, particularly Baius and 
Jansenius (see Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 33–34). See also Nichols, “Henri 
de Lubac: Panorama and Proposal,” 14.
33While Claudel was mentioned all throughout The Discovery of God (see Xavier 
Tilliette, “Henri de Lubac: The Legacy of a Theologican,” trans. Mark Sebanc, 
Communio 19 [1992]: 338), de Lubac devotes a whole part of The Drama of Atheist 
Humanism to the novels of Dostoevsky (see de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist 
Humanism, 161–244).
34Scattered around his various works were references to philosophers like 
Henri Bergson, Gabriel Marcel, and Martin Buber, among many others, who 
take the understanding of human existence towards a direction that is largely 
phenomenological. In fact, he has written several reflections on the works 
of these existential thinkers. See Tilliette, “Henri de Lubac: The Legacy of a 
Theologican,” 333.
35Grumett, “Henri de Lubac: Looking for Books to Read the World,” 236–237; 
Nichols, “Henri de Lubac: Panorama and Proposal,” 5–10.
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One, however, must not discredit the great influence of St. Thomas 
Aquinas on de Lubac. His own study of the Angelic Doctor and the 
development of his thought in history led de Lubac to challenge and 
confront the Thomism of his time. He saw in St. Thomas a great desire 
and effort, grounded in the spiritual life and the Sacred Scriptures, to 
articulate his own faith. It was therefore necessary to return to this 
desire to fully understand St. Thomas’ philosophical and theological 
synthesis. In doing so, de Lubac was aided by the works of French 
neo-scholastics such as Joseph Maréchal, Jacques Maritain, and Étienne 
Gilson, among many others.36
Through this rich variety of sources, de Lubac tried to articulate 
an understanding of divine revelation that countered the reductionist 
rationalism of his time. This effort is fully seen in The Discovery of God, 
which he deliberately leaves fragmentary yet which conveys his single 
and most coherent thought on divine revelation.37 Here de Lubac 
presents two evident paths: the first path, a “negative” one, establishes 
God’s distance from any concept of Him; this distance, however, paves 
the way for the second path, a “positive” one, which affirms the 
mystery of God who reveals himself as love most especially in and 
through Jesus Christ.
In the book’s introductory essay “Abyssus Abyssum Invocat,” de 
Lubac lays down his project of showing who and what God really is. 
He speaks of the God who introduced himself to Moses as the negation 
of all human gods constructed by myth and legend.38 From there, he 
points out the incomprehensibility of God as the abyss that cannot be 
fathomed, much less equated with the gods the human being created 
for himself. This leads to an important question: in what way is this 
God not the same as the other gods of human thought and imagination?
The answer to this is found throughout all of de Lubac’s works, and 
all of these converge upon a single answer: the incomprehensible God 
36See von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri de Lubac, 12–16.
37de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 9.
38de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 12.
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cannot be identified with any single concept, or with any combination 
of all these concepts. De Lubac is aware how the concept of God has 
been used by the modernist thinkers to establish and galvanize systems 
of thought; in doing so, however, they ultimately “lean upon God in 
the very act of denying Him.”39 Simply put, the real ground for their 
denial of God is in thinking that God is the same as their concepts 
of him and nothing more.
But the Christian God is not the God of reason and progress, “the 
first being in the chain of causes,” and thus a mere principle or starting 
point to be able to explain everything.40 He is also not the ultimate 
point of a historical evolution brought about by dissatisfaction with 
the earlier gods the human mind invented,41 and he is definitely not 
a mere principle that offers sufficient reason for everything, or the 
conclusion of arguments that lead logically to belief.42 For de Lubac, 
the God of Christianity, in his whole Godself, could in no way be 
reduced to these concepts.
But what can be said of God when all the concepts that the human 
being has mistaken for God have been rejected? At this point, de 
Lubac borrows the mystical insight of the thinkers of the ancient and 
medieval Church, whose words and thoughts he valued because their 
experience of God was more direct and immediate as opposed to the 
philosophers’ knowledge of God which is mediated and conditioned 
by reason and understanding.43 Because the mystics desire union with 
39de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 41. He thus points out that the reduction of 
God to concepts that would complete philosophical systems would eventually 
be denied of His existence, further alienating God from human experience. 
This is the god that Nietzsche denies, one who “cannot live anywhere but in 
the human mind” (de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 19).
40de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 42, 67.
41de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 34.
42de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 41.
43This does not mean, however, that the philosopher cannot gain access 
to a genuine knowledge of God. De Lubac points to St. Thomas as one who 
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the God whom they come to know in their own contemplation and 
prayer, they arrive at something greater, “more fundamental and more 
total than the demands of reason.”44 Because they desire and ask for 
something that goes beyond mere knowledge, the mystics have been 
given a genuine experience of God.45
What de Lubac then saw in the mystical tradition is an attempt 
to speak of God as he shows Himself. Its language touches upon 
the divine reality but at the same time does not provide a complete 
definition of who God is. For St. Augustine and St. Anselm, God is the 
“illuminating” and “inaccessible” Light.46 For St. Bernard of Clairvaux, 
he is “beyond weight and measure and number.”47 For St. Hilary, 
“there is nothing above him [God], nothing outside him, nothing 
without him. Beneath him, in him and with him are all things ….” 
According to St. Gregory the Great, he is “everywhere … one and the 
same … penetrating all things by engulfing them, engulfing them by 
goes beyond the desire to explain and understand everything around him, 
from knowing the cause to the very nature of this cause. There is, however, a 
bridge that separates the concept of God from God Himself which can only 
be crossed by a “mystical impulse,” one which St. Thomas was not able to 
fully articulate but nevertheless was able to arrive at by admitting that reason 
cannot fully understand and fathom the nature of this cause. See de Lubac, 
The Discovery of God, 141–148.
44de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 143.
45De Lubac emphasizes this when he speaks of divine revelation and 
knowledge of it in experience as “belonging to [a] different order” (Henri de 
Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature & Grace, trans. Brother Richard Arnandez [San 
Francisco: St. Ignatius Press, 1984], 28–29), echoing the words of Blaise Pascal 
regarding divine revelation (see Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer 
[London: Penguin, 1966], §308/793).
46See de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 15, 47. He also sees the image of light in 
Hugh of St. Victor’s and St. John of the Cross’ exegesis of Rom. 1:20 (see de 
Lubac, The Discovery of God, 93).
47de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 76.
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penetrating them.”48 Pseudo-Dionysius describes him as “being his 
own being,” but also the “being of all.”49 And St. Thomas, the great 
philosopher of Being, admits that one does not and cannot completely 
know “‘what he is’: we only know ‘the relation of everything else to 
him.’”50 All these ways of naming God point to what St. Gregory of 
Nyssa and St. Augustine describe as one who is beyond comprehension, 
identification, and description.51
The experience and teachings of the ancient and medieval thinkers, 
which contain elements of mysticism, show that God would always 
escape thought. Just when the human mind thinks that it has known 
God, He withdraws from reason and eludes comprehension. He 
remains “above all names and all thought, beyond every ideal and 
beyond all value.”52
From this careful consideration of what God is not, de Lubac was 
able to establish the negative element of divine revelation as “the 
incommensurable, the inapprehensible, that is to say impregnable.”53 In 
this way, de Lubac was able to affirm the distance of God from reason, 
that is, from total representation and conceptualization.
This does not mean, however, that this distance is the final word 
about God, as if he can be relegated to an abstract, unnameable mystery. 
For de Lubac, this is only a step towards coming to know who God 
really is. This negation, therefore, is in service of greater affirmation 
48de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 99.
49de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 92.
50de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 143.
51Gregory of Nyssa shows that knowing the name of God does not mean getting 
a hold of it (de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 145). St. Augustine expresses this more 
directly, saying that, in de Lubac’s words, “[r]easoning by itself, supposing that 
the initiative were entirely mine … would give me only a completely indirect 
and wholly abstract knowledge” (de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 95).
52de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 107; see also 121.
53de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 120.
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that knowledge of God can only come from God Himself, who 
gratuitously makes Himself known to his creatures.54 Thus, knowledge 
of God comes not from the effort of the human mind to comprehend 
and define Him, but from His own self-disclosure.55
This paves the way for the second path to the knowledge of 
God which allows the human being to recognize and identify the 
inexhaustible and ineffable mystery of God, that mystery which goes 
beyond mere affirmations or negations, or the dialectical relationship 
between the two. For de Lubac, this knowledge is found at the very 
site where God comes to make Himself known—the innermost depths 
of the human spirit. That is where God resides and where the human 
being comes to be aware of Him. This kind of knowledge is deeper 
than any of the metaphysical and logical proofs of God’s existence as it 
is in this instance that the human being becomes aware of something 
that lies beyond himself and yet within himself.56 
By looking inward, the human being comes to see and hear the 
mysterious God calling to him, showing Himself to be his fulfilment, 
the ultimate meaning and transcendence that he seeks and ultimately 
desires. Here, according to de Lubac, is the unique path, in fact the 
truly Christian path, towards the affirmation of God. Instead of 
positing arguments that show the logical and rational necessity for 
belief, de Lubac shifts toward a language of invitation. He not only 
affirms that the mystery of God cannot be grasped by a concept; he 
also shows that this mystery can only be experienced and affirmed in 
the depths of the human being. In other words, this God can only be 
known intimately and personally. The idea of God that originates from 
such knowledge is far from being the objective ideas and concepts that 
the sciences produce in the mind. And while it is true that doubt can 
54de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 123, 127.
55De Lubac sees this point in the words of St. Irenaeus: “God himself is 
our authority about God; otherwise he is not known …. No one can have any 
knowledge of God unless God teaches him” (de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 13).
56de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 12–14.
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be cast on this idea, as the human sciences explain it to be something 
else and attribute a certain origin or cause to it, de Lubac is aware that 
the inward movements are still valid and would certainly lead to God.57
In going to the inner depths of the human consciousness and 
spirit, what does the human person find there in relation to the God 
whom he is seeking? Certainly, he does not find an objective and 
rational principle within. Instead, he finds a Thou who invites him to a 
personal encounter and relationship. Such an experience goes beyond 
understanding in the mind, for it affects the human being in his totality. 
Furthermore, this Thou, who calls the human person from the depths 
of his heart, reveals Himself within the context of the relationship that 
He wishes to establish. In other words, He discloses Himself in relation 
to the human being. This self-disclosure is not something “objective”:
It exists within an inter-subjectivity. It is not the exteriority of a He … 
but of the Thou par excellence. It is not the exteriority of an object which 
one dominates … but that of a subject to which one gives oneself, in 
which one finds oneself, which one has to think of as subsistent. That 
subject is in truth the Other, in the strongest possible sense of the word: 
the absolute Other, the mysterious Being enclosed within itself, always 
beyond our grasp, the totally personal Being, “the only Thou which, 
by definition, cannot be That.” He cannot be represented, but whose 
reality is all the more compelling; through the knowledge of whom 
we become conscious of ourselves ….58
Here one can see how de Lubac strengthens the notion of God’s 
distance from thought, and yet he provides a way, in fact the only way, 
towards affirming God’s existence and his relationship with the human 
being. Therefore, inseparable from this notion of distance is a personal 
and intimate nearness to God not as a distant idea of the Absolute, 
but as the Absolute Himself whom the human being ultimately and 
wholly desires. In this way, there is a greater affirmation of God which 
in no way negates or displaces any of the concepts attributed to Him. 
In fact, it is only in the context of this personal encounter that these 
57de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 13–15. Regarding the idea of God, see 18–21.
58de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 101–102.
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concepts can be fully understood as pointing to, but not defining, 
God, that all ways of naming God imply that he is not merely such.59 
One recognizes, therefore, an abyss that thought and language cannot 
completely fathom.60 All ideas of God put together cannot fully grasp 
or comprehend him, for they constitute only a part of his inexhaustible 
mystery that the human being cannot understand in its totality.
If there is, however, a more “precise” way of naming and 
identifying God in our language and thought, it can only be done 
through the use of paradox and analogy. The images and significations 
we use of God belong to the order of symbols and metaphors. They 
point to something that is of another order, higher than that of reason 
and thought.61 On the one hand, analogy would always remind us that 
whatever we attribute to God always comes from our encounter with 
God as articulated in human language, and thus cannot be wholly 
accurate. On the other hand, the paradoxes we apply to God and his 
mystery (e.g., distant yet near, universal and absolute yet personal, 
known yet unknowable, transcendent yet immanent) are not mere 
figures of speech to communicate what is seemingly incommunicable; 
rather, they are very real paradoxes, truths placed against each other 
not to invalidate but to enrich each other.62 They are not meant to be 
analysed to achieve clarity of thought; rather, they invite the human 
being to enter into the mystery they refer to.
59de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 78. In affirming this, de Lubac also affirms a 
fundamental epistemological claim implicit in all proofs and concepts of God, 
namely that, according to Maréchal, “there is always more in the concept than 
the concept itself” (de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 95).
60de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 116.
61de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 23, 93; de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature & 
Grace, 67. Referring specifically to the paradox of mystery, he refers to paradoxes 
as those which arise in every mystery as “the hallmark of a truth that is beyond 
our depth” (de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 218).
62de Lubac, “The Mystery of the Supernatural,” 308; Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes, 
trans. Paule Simon & Sadie Kreilkamp (South Bend: Fides Publishers, 1948), 12.
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One enters this mystery only by faith through which these 
paradoxes are resolved and at the same time maintained. It is through 
the most personal act of believing, which “reaches the secret depths 
of the soul,” that the human being has an authentic experience and 
knowledge of the God who reveals Himself.63 Through faith, the 
human being comes to see clearly God’s mystery not in the form of 
mere propositions that provide clear definitions, but as the truth which 
penetrates his whole being and is definitely more than what he can 
say or describe.64
For de Lubac, this personal encounter with the mystery of God 
grants the human being the capability to know and name God 
as He really is: “God is Charity,” as Saint John would point out 
(1 John 4:8, 16). He is himself the Truth, Justice, and Wisdom which 
are always infinitely beyond the truth, justice, and wisdom that the 
human being possesses and at the same time searches for.65 God gives 
himself as a gift to the human being, a gift which, in the depths of 
his soul, he longs to see and receive.66 In order to receive this gift, he 
is called to respond to its summons, namely, to live a life of charity, 
truth, justice, and wisdom, for only in doing so can he “possess” God, 
63de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 154; de Lubac, Paradoxes, 9–10; de Lubac, The 
Mystery of the Supernatural, 222–223.
64de Lubac, “The Mystery of the Supernatural,” 309; de Lubac, The Discovery 
of God, 111–112; de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature & Grace, 71. This mystery, 
for de Lubac, summons us toward action and being, which one experiences in 
seeing one’s own situation in relation to the God who is always beyond himself 
(de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 156). Regarding this, Tilliette points out how 
de Lubac refers to the mystery of God through the notion of “ontological 
mystery” which de Lubac sees as well in Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Blondel, 
Charles Péguy, and Paul Claudel (see Tilliette, “Henri de Lubac: The Legacy 
of a Theologican,” 338).
65de Lubac, Paradoxes, 13; de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 107; de Lubac, The 
Mystery of the Supernatural, 299.
66de Lubac, “The Mystery of the Supernatural,” 298.
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be in union with Him, and thus live in the ultimate transcendence and 
meaning that he constantly searches for, and is on the way toward.67
As a Thou, God does not reveal Himself as a voice from heaven 
like the one Abraham and Moses heard. Rather, out of His gratuity, 
that is, His charity, He manifests Himself to the human being as a 
Thou to be encountered personally in his concrete life situation. “The 
Christian knows that the only way to a real encounter with God is the 
Living Way which is called Jesus Christ.”68
It is the glory of Christ shining in all his thoughts, words, and 
actions which grasps His disciples and leads them toward a different 
way of living and being. Christ reveals the mystery of God in its 
fullness.69 His glory shines resplendently in the mystery of the Cross 
by which God gathers humanity in His embrace and renews it through 
a love that is never self-centered, a love that is offered even under the 
pain of not being loved back, a love that ultimately saves the human 
being from sin and death.70 It is through the Cross that the human 
being—grasped and engulfed by the truth and glory of Christ—sees 
God and enters into a very intimate union with him. Christ thus stands 
at the center of the mystery that the believer seeks to enter into. In 
Christ, everything is brought together in a synthesis that goes beyond 
67See de Lubac, Paradoxes, 13–14.
68de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 212. It is also remarkable at this point to note 
that, for de Lubac, it is in the mystery of the Incarnation, and thus in Jesus Christ, 
that paradoxes become alive and palpable for the human being without being 
reduced or relegated to one term or another, as He Himself is the paradox that 
is both God and man (see Wood, “The Nature-Grace Problematic Within Henri 
de Lubac’s Christological Paradox,” 401; de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 28–29).
69See de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 209–210; de Lubac, The Mystery of the 
Supernatural, 298; de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature & Grace, 153–154.
70de Lubac, Catholicism, 367–369; de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature & 
Grace, 157–161. See also Wood, “The Nature-Grace Problematic Within Henri 
de Lubac’s Christological Paradox,” 399–401; Tilliette, “Henri de Lubac: The 
Legacy of a Theologican,” 339–340.
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any form of synthetic or dialectic reasoning.71 As such, He also stands 
as the center and foundation of the Christian faith and life.
Looking at de Lubac’s treatment of divine revelation as a whole, 
we can then conclude that the distance of God from reason which de 
Lubac sought to establish is only in view of a further and ever greater 
affirmation. De Lubac points out that we can truly encounter and fully 
experience the mystery of God only in Jesus Christ who reveals Himself 
in the depths of our human heart. In and through Christ, God draws 
us toward union with Him in whom we can find our ultimate meaning 
and destiny. For de Lubac, this is the path towards discovering God, 
as well as being the foundation of his whole theology.
IV. Mystery as the Foundation of the 
Christian Faith and Life
In providing a panorama of de Lubac’s whole life and how it shaped 
and influenced his theology, Aidan Nichols proposes that de Lubac’s 
concern for unity in all aspects stands as the center of all his efforts.72 
However, with this articulation of divine revelation, it is possible to 
dig deeper and claim that something more fundamental lies within 
it. The concern for unity in de Lubac is rooted in a deeper and firmer 
foundation: the desire to comprehend and live in the mystery of the 
God who reveals Himself.73 To show this rootedness, three aspects 
will be briefly discussed: the human person’s understanding of his own 
existence, the relationship between nature and grace (widely known 
as de Lubac’s greatest contribution to theology), and the life of the 
Church and her final destiny in Christ.
71von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri de Lubac, 61.
72Nichols, “Henri de Lubac: Panorama and Proposal,” 31–32.
73Xavier Tilliette, a disciple of de Lubac, emphasizes that what stands as the 
“guiding thread” of de Lubac’s works is “[t]he Idea of God” and the “life of 
the spirit” (Tilliette, “Henri de Lubac: The Legacy of a Theologican,” 336).
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First, de Lubac finds this understanding of divine revelation to be 
the foundation of his understanding of human existence. Returning 
to the great insights of the ancient and medieval Church on creation, 
he says that this way of understanding divine revelation also leads us 
to a certain way of understanding the human being as a creature. De 
Lubac sees the human person as inevitably and strongly linked to 
the Creator in whose image he is made. This has several implications 
and consequences for being truly human.74 Like God in an analogical 
manner, the human being himself is incomprehensible. He is also a 
mystery, an abyss unto himself. The meaning of his existence is 
linked to the God who is his true and final end. What he must do is 
understand his own being in relation to God, in whom alone he can 
truly understand and see himself.75 Above all, the ultimate demand 
placed on the human being as a creature is to enter into the charity 
of God, i.e., to live His own life of charity, which in a way allows the 
human being to be moved and elevated towards something outside 
and above himself.76 A certain unity is thus established here by the 
mystery of God: namely, the unity between the human being and 
God, in whom the former can attain the beatitude which he longs for. 
In this unity, however, there is distance and nearness, similarity and 
difference, existing at the same time, or, simply put, a paradox that 
finds its root in the paradox of the mystery of God.
74de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 126–127; de Lubac, The Mystery of the 
Supernatural, 127. By extension, de Lubac also notes that in the recognition of all 
other beings as creatures, one also sees in them a theophany, or the manifestation 
of God Himself (Tilliette, “Henri de Lubac: The Legacy of a Theologican,” 336; 
de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 84; de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 92–93).
75de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 12, 16; de Lubac, Catholicism, 29–30. In this 
regard, de Lubac goes back to St. Augustine, who points out that in pursuing 
the desire for the human being to know himself, one becomes aware only of 
one thing—that, as a creature, the human being is created only by and for the 
Creator (see de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 17, 156).
76Henri de Lubac, “The Total Meaning of Man and the World,” trans. D. 
C. Schindler, Communio 35 (2008): 636–667. See also de Lubac, The Discovery 
of God, 112–113.
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One must note that this unity is fully realized in the recognition 
and acceptance of the mystery of Christ. He is able to cross the infinite 
distance that exists—due to their ontological difference and also 
because of human sin—between God and humanity; Christ grants the 
human being new life in God through His death and resurrection.77 
It is in and through Christ that this unity is achieved by the grace of 
the God who reveals himself as Love.
This is inevitably related to the second aspect of the faith which 
is founded on God’s mystery—namely, the relationship between 
nature and grace, or, for de Lubac, nature and the supernatural. 
Against the interpretation of Cajetan and Suarez, de Lubac argues that 
there really is, i.e., ontologically, no pure nature that stands apart from 
the supernatural.78 He points out that the human being, by its very 
nature, is ordained towards a supernatural end, thus bearing a “divine 
vocation.”79 This ordination, however, is granted as grace springing 
forth from the magnanimous God.
De Lubac defends his stand and explains it further in the context 
of the relationship between God as Creator and the human being as 
creature. According to de Lubac, the very act of creating the human 
77de Lubac, Catholicism, 39–40. De Lubac further adds that through Christ, the 
human being comes to know not only God’s charity but also the charity that 
he is called to live and be (see de Lubac, “The Mystery of the Supernatural,” 
314–315). But more than that, it is also through Christ that the human being 
comes to fully know himself as such (de Lubac, Catholicism, 339).
78de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 94–95. De Lubac recognizes the 
complexity of the term “human nature,” saying that, contrary to the modernist 
commentators of St. Thomas, it is far from being a thing by and unto itself, and 
which can be equated to all other existing “natures.” This complexity, however, 
can only be seen when nature is understood from the point of view of creation 
and the richness and mystery of human existence, which, as embodied spirit 
made in the image and likeness of God, is oriented to God as its end (see de 
Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 69–72; de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature 
& Grace, 14–15).
79Chantraine, “The Supernatural Discernment of Catholic Thought According 
to Henri de Lubac,” 39.
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being is itself grace.80 But, besides this datum optimum, God also grants 
“another” grace, the donum perfectum, which is the ordination of the 
human being toward his final end which is God Himself.81
This should not be taken, however, as a mere superimposition of 
one thing (donum perfectum) over another (datum optimum), as if grace is 
a thing to be merely handed over. For de Lubac, it is clear that, in the 
act of existing, the human being is ordained towards a supernatural 
end. But this should not also be taken as identical with nature. He 
maintains that this ordination to the final end still stands as a separate 
gift (donum) from that which is given (datum) to the human being at the 
moment of creation. Through this articulation, de Lubac is still able 
to preserve God’s gratuity towards the human being without resorting 
to two separate planes that stand against each other.82
We see here de Lubac’s solution to the modern problem of nature 
and grace. Being paradoxical in nature, this solution can only be 
understood within the logic of gratuity, i.e., the love and magnanimity 
80de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 100–102.
81de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 114–116; Chantraine, “The 
Supernatural Discernment of Catholic Thought According to Henri de Lubac,” 
38. Wood points out that de Lubac describes this as a “circumincession.” It must 
be clarified that supernature does not add itself to nature, and yet it is both in 
unity with and distinction from nature within the human being (de Lubac, A 
Brief Catechesis on Nature & Grace, 43; Wood, “The Nature-Grace Problematic 
Within Henri de Lubac’s Christological Paradox,” 398).
82This raises a question: what, then, is the place of obediential potency, described 
as a certain “non-repugnance” toward God and used by Cajetan and other 
modernist commentators to refer to the natural desire for God that opens 
the human being towards a supernatural end (Wood, “The Nature-Grace 
Problematic Within Henri de Lubac’s Christological Paradox,” 390–391)? For 
de Lubac, it would be conceptually inadequate to express this natural desire, as 
this concept is tied to the concept of pure nature as a real order separate from a 
“supernature.” He sees this as St. Thomas’ own way of explaining the natural 
desire for God only if there is a purely natural order for the human being, 
which, as de Lubac shows in the whole The Mystery of the Supernatural, would not 
be the case (Wood, “The Nature-Grace Problematic Within Henri de Lubac’s 
Christological Paradox,” 393; de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 182–185).
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of God who gives it in the first place. The donum granted to the human 
being is ultimately rooted in its source—namely, the mystery of God 
who reveals Himself.83 This enables us to see that nature and grace—
or to be more precise, nature and supernatural—are expressions 
and manifestations of God’s mystery as charity, this time in human 
existence.84 Furthermore, the paradox between nature and grace is 
ultimately rooted in the hypostatic union of divine and human natures 
in Jesus Christ, in whom this paradox is resolved and clearly seen. The 
relationship between nature and grace is analogous to the relationship 
between the human nature and the divine nature in Jesus Christ. Most 
importantly, the ordination of the human being to its supernatural end, 
which is God’s donum perfectum given in charity, is seen in Christ’s own 
life, which culminates in His glorification through His passion, death, 
and resurrection.85 Thus, one can see here that the unity of nature 
and grace can only be traced to, and founded in, the mystery of God.
A third aspect which can also be explored and shown to be rooted 
in the mystery of God is the Church as the Body of Christ. The mystery 
of God, revealed fully in Christ’s glorification on the Cross, is shared by 
the community which is Christ’s own Body with Himself as the head.86
De Lubac elaborates this unity further when he says that the 
Church by its very nature is Catholic, i.e., it embraces everyone and 
does not see itself merely as an association of a select few.87 Moreover, 
Christ saves not just people but all of creation—the Church renews the 
83See de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 262–263; de Lubac, A Brief 
Catechesis on Nature & Grace, 65.
84de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 217–218. On de Lubac’s argument 
regarding the distinction between “nature” and “supernatural,” in opposition 
to “nature” and “supernature,” see de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature & 
Grace, 37–53.
85Wood, “The Nature-Grace Problematic Within Henri de Lubac’s 
Christological Paradox,” 401; de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature & Grace, 81–83.
86See de Lubac, Catholicism, 39–40, 56–60.
87de Lubac, Catholicism, 48–53.
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world and gathers all of it toward Christ.88 This enables us to see the 
call and mission of the Church, as the Body of Christ, to take part in 
Christ’s own mission of uniting the world to Himself as the common 
and final destiny of all. Here one sees the paradoxical nature of the 
Church: it is particular and yet universal, in this world but not of this 
world. These are characteristics that the Church shares analogously 
and participatively with Christ, who is both human and divine. This 
unity, expressed in paradoxes, can only be fully understood in God’s 
revelation in Jesus Christ, both immanent and transcendent.
For de Lubac, what stands as the foundation of these three 
interrelated elements is divine revelation—God’s personal self-
disclosure that can only be understood in the context of our own 
encounter with Him in faith. In acknowledging and entering this 
mystery, we can understand the unity of Christian life in all its aspects, 
a unity expressed in various paradoxical unities (the human being and 
God, nature and grace, the Church and Christ, among others) that 
are already realized and yet still striving to be fully realized. For de 
Lubac, the final word regarding these paradoxes is yet to be explored 
and discovered. Like “the deep calling to the deep” (Psalm 42:7), 
God calls us from the depths of our being to new ways of seeing and 
experiencing the truth, to a new way of encountering and knowing 
Him whom we long for.89
V. Conclusion
This discussion of de Lubac’s theology of revelation brings out a 
profound truth about God and human existence in relation to Him. 
Against various forms of atheism of his time, de Lubac points out that 
the Christian God is infinitely beyond the God that human reason 
understands. Here de Lubac establishes a distance between God and 
the human mind, yet this distance opens up the human heart towards 
88See de Lubac, Catholicism, 282–298; Wood, “The Nature-Grace Problematic 
Within Henri de Lubac’s Christological Paradox,” 401–402.
89See de Lubac, The Discovery of God, 211–212.
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a greater and richer affirmation of God—the mystery that summons 
the human person to a new life and a new way of living. Moreover, the 
mystery of God who reveals Himself as charity is fully manifested in 
and through Jesus Christ; this mystery stands as the foundation not 
just of the knowledge of God but also of the human being himself 
and the world. De Lubac’s articulation of divine revelation thus sheds 
light on several aspects of the Christian faith and life, especially those 
we confront and grapple with today.
What emerges from all of this is a unique intellectual attitude 
towards faith and belief. We can detect in de Lubac’s work a 
fundamental openness to engage the questions of his time, as well 
as the willingness to provide answers which take into account the 
early Christian sources and the great theologians of the Church. In 
his grappling with questions on human existence and its inseparable 
link with God, de Lubac has left us a great heritage: a commitment 
to, and passion for, knowledge of the Christian faith which leads to a 
renewal and reorientation of one’s life. 
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